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RESUMEN: Recientemente se han realizado varios intentos para unir el campo de 
estudios sobre la metáfora tratando de conciliar los enfoques conceptual-cognitivo 
y lingüístico-discursivo (Hampe, 2017a). Se dice que la visión dinámica de la 
metáfora como una forma de unificar el campo de los estudios de metáforas 
converge en los hallazgos y las predicciones teóricas encontradas en varios 
enfoques (Gibbs, 2017a). El autor fundamenta su enfoque en modelos dinámicos 
para explicar los aspectos socio-cognitivos de escala múltiple de la metáfora, ya 
que un fenómeno emergente no es lo suficientemente robusto. La complejidad y 
los sistemas dinámicos son simplemente una técnica de modelado que permita 
implementar la teoría a través de la prueba empírica de hipótesis. Una visión 
dinámica de la metáfora necesita una teoría de fondo coherente sobre la que 
fundamentar su modelado dinámico de la metáfora en acción (Chemero, 2009). En 
este artículo propongo que esta base puede estar fundamentada con éxito en el 
marco ecológico-enactivo que se enmarca en el paradigma moderno de la ciencia 
cognitiva 4E. Además, en este artículo esbozo cómo los conocimientos teóricos 
recientes del marco ecológico-enactivo (Baggs and Chemero, 2018, 2019) sobre 
la noción de medio ambiente de Gibson (1979) se aplican al intento de unificación 
del campo de estudios de metáforas. Concluyo sugiriendo cómo una comprensión 
de la metáfora como una provisión ecológica del entorno sociocultural puede 
proporcionar una base rica para hipótesis empíricas dentro de una ciencia dinámica 
de la metáfora. 
 
Palabras clave: psicología ecológica, enactivismo, sistemas dinámicos, 
ofrecimientos estimulares, metáfora, filosofía de la ciencia cognitiva. 
 
ABSTRACT: Recently several attempts were undertaken to unite the field of 
metaphor studies, trying to reconcile the conceptual/cognition and 
linguistic/discourse approaches to metaphor (Hampe, 2017a). The dynamic view 
of metaphor as a way to unify the field of metaphor studies is said to converge on 
findings and theoretical predictions found in cognition and discourse approaches 
(Gibbs, 2017a). The author argues the focus on dynamical models to explain the 
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multi-scale socio-cognitive aspects of metaphor as an emergent phenomenon is 
not robust enough. Complexity and dynamical systems are merely a modelling 
technique to deploy theory for empirical testing of hypotheses; a dynamic view of 
metaphor needs a coherent background theory to base its dynamic modelling of 
metaphor in action on (Chemero, 2009). I argue that it can be successfully based 
on the ecological-enactive framework available within the modern paradigm of 
4E cognitive science. This framework makes possible explanation of both 'lower' 
cognition and 'higher' cognition emerging in the interaction of an organism with 
its environment. In addition, I sketch how recent theoretical insights from 
ecological-enactivism (Baggs and Chemero 2018, 2019) concerning Gibson’s 
notion of environment (Gibson 1979) apply to the attempted unification of the field 
of metaphor studies. I close by suggesting how an understanding of metaphor as 
an ecological affordance of the socio-cultural environment can provide a rich basis 
for empirical hypotheses within a dynamical science of metaphor. 
 
Key words: ecological psychology, enactivism, dynamical systems, affordances, 





The meaning of metaphor is contested and debated over between multiple research 
programs in metaphor studies. These programs are at odds not just about the empirical 
phenomenon of metaphor (i.e. what is the right level of analysis) but also about the 
applicability of research methods (Gibbs, 2017a: 83-90, b; Steen, 2017)1. Recent attempts 
were undertaken to unite the field, trying to reconcile divergent approaches to metaphor 
(Hampe, 2017a). These attempts illustrate the differences between embodied cognition 
and discourse approaches to metaphor, but also point to resources available within the 
social and cognitive sciences to ameliorate this division. According to Hampe, a “socio-
cognitive [dynamical model]” of metaphor can “bridge the cognition-discourse divide” 
(Hampe, 2017b: 4). In recent work by Raymond Gibbs we find a similar approach to a 
dynamical view of metaphor (Gibbs, 2017a: 216-221). 
I take the extant dynamical view of metaphor to concentrate on two central points. 
One of these is that the dynamical view is reflecting a larger cumulative corrective phase 
within metaphor studies due to insights how metaphor is an emergent processual 
phenomenon coming about through the interaction of many factors (cf. Gibbs, 2017b: 
331). The other point is the integrative character of such a dynamic approach. It allows 
for a multitude of perspectives and approaches to metaphor, including cognition and 
discourse approaches, to be subsumed in a coherent unified whole.  Importantly, metaphor 
dynamicists share a commitment to give a non-reductive explanation of metaphor 
consisting of more than one preferred level (cf. Hampe, 2017b: 11). 
                                               
1 There are more approaches than the archetypical Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) and Deliberate 
Metaphor Theory (DMT) that fall either on the conceptual / embodiment / cognition or linguistic / 
discourse / communication pole of metaphor studies. CMT adopts an embodied cognition perspective on 
metaphor, seeing the bodily and cognitive nature of metaphor as primary, investigating the conceptual 
metaphor-as-mapping (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2003, 1999; Gibbs, 2017a). DMT adopts a discourse 
perspective on metaphor, emphasizing the social interaction in which metaphor is deliberately used as 
opposed to various non-deliberate instances of metaphorical language (Steen, 2017). See Hampe (2017b) 
for an overview. 
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My worry about the present dynamical view of metaphor is that it is not yet a 
comprehensive scientific research program. Most, if not all, scholars focus on 
reconceptualizing metaphor as a dynamic emergent phenomenon. Some show the 
dynamics and complexity involved in actual discourse situations can be reanalysed 
through dynamic systems terminology. To become a flourishing research program, 
however, future research must move beyond the idea that “a set of models created on the 
fly to be applied to incoming data” is all there is to a dynamical view of metaphor 
(Chemero, 2009: 100). One must also give a positive account of what metaphor is and 
does (cf. Hampe, 2017b: 4). I believe that metaphor dynamicists have yet to provide such 
an account. 
In what follows I first sketch the extant thinking about dynamical views of 
metaphor and related principles of dynamic systems theory, often used to analyse 
discourse events. I will then explain why current methodology is not robust enough to put 
forward a dynamical view as an independent scientific research program. In order to 
address this point, in this paper I argue the need to shore up a dynamical view of metaphor 
with a background theory. With this groundwork laid I explicate the ecological-enactive 
framework and argue for its use as background theory within a dynamical view of 
metaphor. Following the work of Baggs and Chemero (2018, 2019), I suggest that their 
reconstructed notion of environment can be seen as an example of the kinds of theoretical 
resources that the ecological-enactive framework can provide as background theory. I 
then examine whether it can be used to understand current theoretical and empirical 
content within metaphor studies. I close by arguing that an understanding of metaphor as 
an ecological affordance of the socio-cultural environment, can provide a rich basis for 
empirical hypotheses within a dynamical science of metaphor.  
 
2. THE DYNAMICAL VIEW OF METAPHOR 
 
I now discuss several dynamicists’s views to examine what their approach to 
metaphor entails. I end up concluding they all consider metaphor a processual 
phenomenon fit for reconceptualization using dynamical systems terminology. However, 
such approaches fail to make any (new) empirical predictions. If and how this is a problem 
for the dynamical view of metaphor will be treated in the next section. 
 
2.1. METAPHORICITY AS GRADED ACTIVATION OF METAPHOR 
 
Müller (2008) initiates her dynamical view by arguing for the importance of a 
dynamic sleeping/waking distinction at the use level over the traditional dead/alive (or 
conventional/novel) distinction at the system level of metaphor.2 She shows at the level 
of use there is a subset of dead metaphor that varies in activation and salience, introducing 
the notion of metaphoricity to express this graded cognitive activation. Metaphor rests 
upon a “modality independent” cognitive process of activating metaphoricity, with its 
products “[materializing] in different modalities” (Müller, 2008: 215).3 Depending on 
                                               
2 I understand the use level to mean social interaction, which includes discourse events (cf. Hampe, 
2017b: 7). The system level is the lexicalized language system, consisting of conventionalized symbolic 
units of a language. Unlike Müller I consider both levels inherently dynamic. 
3 I take Müller to mean that a modality independent cognitive process is a process taking place in a brain 
region independent of sensorimotor processing areas. My position is that such processes have too much 
counterevidence from cognitive neuroscience suggesting the brain is not massively modular like that but 
consists of functional clusters of neurons soft-assembled to perform tasks (Machielsen, 2017: 68-70; cf. 
Edelman, 1992; Tucker, 2007). This is consistent with a recent proposal for the brain’s architecture to 
work according to ‘neural reuse’ (Anderson, 2014). 
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context and intention in the ongoing interpersonal dynamics of discourse this intra-
personally activated metaphoricity changes. For Müller “salience is the observable 
indicator of activated metaphoricity,” and one sees such metaphoricity “when it shows up 
in various modalities, triggers verbal elaborations, and/or is foregrounded” (ibidem: 209).  
Her dynamical view is instrumentally useful for clearing up a longstanding 
dichotomy (ibidem: 221). But it also locates cognitive dynamics solely at the skull-bound 
level. While the instantiating of “a collectively established system” reveals “metaphors 
operate on the level of a linguistic system and on the level of use,” Müller claims that 
only “in use their nature is inherently dynamic” (ibidem: 221). 
 
2.2. CONTOURS OF A DYNAMICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM 
 
Unlike Müller, Gibbs and Cameron (2008) explicitly employ dynamic systems 
theory to show metaphor performance can be explained as a type of higher-order complex 
behaviour pattern.4 All behaviour emerges from “interaction of a system’s components 
rather than from specialized cognitive or neurological mechanisms” (ibidem: 67). An 
individual’s behaviour emerges within a continuously coupled interaction of a brain, 
body, environment system. A human environment importantly includes social interaction. 
What are called self-organizing processes “emerge from both intra and interpersonal 
interactions” (ibidem: 65). Such processes give rise to continuously altering temporarily 
stable structures, from “knowledge structures” in an “individual’s mind,” to “status 
hierarchies … among a group,” or “clusters of shared beliefs and other cultural norms … 
across populations” due to interpersonal communication and influencing (ibidem: 67-68). 
Emerging structures show “reciprocal causality” or a “downward force” on “lower-level 
behaviors” (ibidem: 67). An example is how cultural considerations can shape a couple’s 
metaphor performance during marital counselling.  
The multidimensional dynamic model of metaphor comprises a large array of 
levels, from the neurophysiological level enabling organism-environment interactions 
(i.e. locomotion, perception, and cognition) to the evolutionary level where phylogenetic 
development of the species takes place.5 Metaphor is always a result of forces working at 
different spatiotemporal scales, from split-second cognitive processing to the centuries in 
which human culture took form (Hampe, 2017b: 11; cf. Gibbs, 2017a: 216; Kövecses, 
2015).  So, metaphor is never merely a conceptual mapping in the mind according to 
Gibbs, as “what happens at the cognitive level is partly determined by the neural and 
evolutionary constraints” (Gibbs, 2017b: 333-334). Nor can metaphor be reduced to an 
analysis of a discourse as the discourse level “is always partly embodied, and indeed, 
bodily experience is itself shaped by cultural and discourse factors” (ibidem). 
Gibbs and Cameron argue little effort has been put into understanding how such 
synchronous factors influence metaphor performance. Instead, metaphor scholars 
selectively emphasize and privilege those factors or levels important to their discipline or 
                                               
4 Dynamical systems have three characteristics: 1) a number of interacting components or agents, 2) they 
exhibit emergent behaviour (the collective behaviour cannot be predicted by the behaviour of the 
components separately), and 3) this emergent behaviour is self-organized (it does not result from a 
controlling component). 
5 Hampe (2017a) lists the following levels: 
1. (neuro-)physiology 
2. cognition (on/off-line) 
3. discourse/communication (especially but not exclusively face-to-face interaction) 
4. language (systems) 
5. culture 
6. evolution 
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logically following from their method (ibidem: 65-67; cf. Gibbs, 2017b, c). Our 
philosophical and methodological approaches in studying metaphor have an enormous 
implication for our respective theories of metaphor and can protract endless dichotomous 
debates. Worse, the consequences of metaphor experiments are sometimes reified and 
read back as the sole causal determinant or structure underlying a process. An example is 
the idea of a metaphor as cross-domain mapping realized as neural structure. Empirical 
data is inconclusive about whether such neural structures are consistently accessed, if they 
exist at all, because different findings show stability, instability or no effect at all 
(ibidem).6 
Importantly, different experimental results now seen as contradictory might reflect 
different dynamical configurations and outcomes (Gibbs, 2017a: 217). Here dynamic 
systems theory can be used to explain the variability in metaphor performance: “If we see 
individuals engaged in conversation as dynamical systems, then patterns observed in 
metaphor performance can be seen as stabilities emerging from the dynamics and 
variability of discourse” (Gibbs and Cameron, 2008: 68). At the level of socio-cultural 
group membership it “may give rise to certain patterns of metaphor use,” and at the 
discourse situation level “particular metaphors may come to be used systematically 
between the individuals as they arrive at shared agreement on how to refer to topics” 
(ibidem: 68). For the authors then, conceptual metaphors are emergent stabilities within 
“the talking-and-thinking of a discourse community, which emerge from many different 
forces, ranging from neural to cultural, and are not fixed, stable entities encoded in the 
minds of individuals” (ibidem: 74). 
Although the strength of dynamic systems theory is explanatory power on all 
levels or scales of a system using the same principles, most researchers “never attempt to 
examine the empirical predictions of dynamic systems theory in [linguistic] studies” 
(Gibbs, 2017c: 67). Gibbs and Cameron themselves note “the idea of [dynamic] systems 
is just a convenient (and metaphorical) way of describing what is going on in the brains 
and bodies of people as they interact with each other and the environment" (2008: 74; 
emphasis mine). Hereby they seemingly suggest the dynamical view is merely useful as 
a descriptive model for post hoc explanations of empirical studies. In later writings Gibbs 
seems undecided as to the right way forward. At one point he implores research on 
“metaphor performance in dynamical terms” by offsetting more traditional research 
methods with dynamic experimental tests (Gibbs, 2017c: 67). Yet another exhortation 
calls for reanalysing existing data from a dynamical perspective as constructing new 
dynamical experiments with empirical predictions will be hard (Gibbs, 2017a: 221). The 
very least scholars from diverse approaches can do is to open up and read other research 
programs’ findings (Gibbs, 2017b: 334). 
 
2.3. DYNAMICS GOES ECOLOGICAL 
 
Jensen reconstructs Müller’s notion of metaphoricity, thereby moving from an 
intrapersonal cognitive dynamic to an intersubjective dynamic system at the ecological 
scale. Metaphoricity is no longer a skull-bound cognitive process selectively activated 
through use, but “emanates as a joint process and accomplishment embedded in the 
dynamics and constraints of living (dialogical) systems” (Jensen, 2017: 260). 
Metaphoricity moves out of the head and into the organism-environment system where 
                                               
6 I merely mean to illustrate that if scientists postulate that the central CMT construct, the metaphor-as-
mapping, is biologically realized by a neural structure, they could conclude that this posited neural 
structure is the sole cause of metaphorical thinking. This (reductive) endpoint is reached not by empirical 
findings alone, but ‘helped’ along by uncritically assumed commitments to a discipline or method. 
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human action takes place (ibidem: 261, 2018: 2). Situating metaphoricity at the ecological 
scale is in line with a new notion of cognition put forward in recent cognitive science.7 
Cognition is seen as “something we do; we enact it, with the world’s help, in our dynamic 
living activities” (Nöe, 2009: 64; cf. Dewey, 1896; Johnson, 2017). Cognition is part of 
our active exploring and sense-making of the world and not a precondition to action. 
Metaphoricity comes about “integrated in inter-bodily dynamics and inter-affective 
behaviours in multimodal interaction” and is not accomplished just by verbal metaphor 
(Jensen, 2017: 259).  
From an ecological perspective discourse is a dynamic system “in which the 
experiences of the participants are jointly shaped by the constraints and affordances 
(Gibson, 1979)” (Jensen, 2017: 260). Metaphoricity is established within this 
interpersonal ecology by “the ongoing and dynamic presence of other people, physical 
artifacts and sociocultural constraints” (ibidem: 257). Participants both adapt to a specific 
interpersonal ecology and co-develop it using diverse (metaphorical) behaviours. The 
emergent metaphorical structure within the interpersonal ecology functions as social 
affordance as it makes “possible certain further (metaphorical) ways of talking, thinking, 
acting and feeling about the topic of conversation” (Jensen, 2018: 19). 
To conclude, metaphoricity is a gradable and shared phenomenon that constrains 
our experience and our ways of acting in the world (cf. Jensen and Greve, 2019). Jensen 
also suggests to study metaphor as affordances which puts metaphor on a proper 
ecological scale of human sense-making instead of previous research analysing it as a 
skull-bound cognitive process or linguistic property only.8 
 
2.4. PROCESSUAL EMERGENT PHENOMENON OF METAPHOR 
 
All authors agree the characteristic feature of a dynamical view is that metaphor 
is not a mere cognitive product but a processual phenomenon emerging from discourse 
situations marked by non-linear interactions between factors, on many levels, over nested 
time-scales with differences in length and speed (from the evolutionary time-scale to 
neural activation). The use of dynamic systems theory shows metaphor can be 
reconceptualized as emergent stabilities over individual, dyad, group, and even 
population or linguistic community levels, thereby accommodating findings to date 
within metaphor studies. While this suggests progress, I urge we better speak about a 
dynamical turn in metaphor methods or modelling than a substantive vision on metaphor 
as dynamical phenomenon. Dynamical methods are used to (re)analyse multimodal 
discourse but so far there are no (new) empirical predictions being made from a dynamical 
perspective. In the next section I argue this is due to the fact that the current dynamical 
view is not a fully progressive research program. 
 
3. CANDIDATE WANTED FOR BACKGROUND THEORY 
 
Although this ‘new and improved’ view of metaphor professes that different 
spatial and temporal levels, or scales, all dynamically interact to produce the emergent 
phenomena of metaphorical action (Gibbs, 2017a, b; Hampe, 2017a: 3-4) this is not yet a 
                                               
7 I use insights from recent cognitive science too. There are many resemblances with Jensen, even more 
so in recent work fully moving to an ecological context for metaphor (Jensen and Greve, 2019). 
8 I have made the same claim from a pragmatic naturalistic point of view (Machielsen, 2017). 
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satisfactory conclusion.9 Mere invocation of complexity and dynamical systems can be 
interpreted as a magic wand intended to get cognition and communication approaches in 
line behind the banner of a dynamical view of metaphor. What is needed is a heuristic 
device to judge whether a move to the dynamical view of metaphor is warranted. 
One well-known heuristic is Lakatos’ idea of progressive research programs.  The 
(theoretical) success of a scientific research program is commonly understood to be 
measured by “[the] new theory [having] some excess empirical content over its 
predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact” (cf. Lakatos, 1978: 
33-34). The research program is also (empirically) progressive when “some of this excess 
empirical content is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads to the discovery 
of some new fact” (ibidem: 34). A historical example of a progressive research program 
was atomistic physics. By positing an underlying structure, it led to verifiable predictions 
and new facts (cf. Chemero, 2009: 80). So, to become a progressive research program, 
the dynamical view of metaphor should be able to both predict new hypotheses and to 
find empirical evidence for these predictions, in addition to covering empirical content of 
its predecessor theory. 
Another heuristic is described by Chemero as the guide to discovery (2009: 78-
83). Chemero illustrates this with a debate in theoretical physics early last century 
between atomists and phenomenalists. The latter refused to posit nonsensible entities or 
properties, like the atomists did. The guide to discovery argument holds that “by assuming 
that there are atoms, one is led to testable predictions of new phenomena” (ibidem: 79). 
Phenomenalist physics was held to be fact dependent: new anomalous empirical results 
led to ad hoc theoretical additions, and there was simply no way to predict novel facts 
through testable hypotheses before experiments. One can of course substitute conceptual 
metaphor theory and the dynamical view into this debate. Like the phenomenalists, 
current dynamicists posit no nonsensible entities or properties, thereby becoming fact 
dependent. This fact dependency necessitates constant alteration to theory “to fit existing 
empirical results,” whereas CMT like atomism can use their theory “to predict empirical 
results before experimentation” (ibidem: 80). In this context it is important to note that 
dynamical systems (theory) is a modelling technique and as such is a set of tools to deploy 
a scientific theory for empirical testing of hypotheses and mediated contact with data 
(ibidem: 99-100). Since modern scientific theories are often too complex to be directly 
tested and result in computational and analytical intractability, models are interposed, 
both accounting for the data, and respecting the theory (ibidem: 100). 
My worry about the dynamical view of metaphor thus boils down to the fact I do 
not consider it as a comprehensive theory yet but as “a set of models created on the fly to 
be applied to incoming data” (ibidem: 100).10 As an example, look at Müller’s starting 
point (2008). We have a system and use level of metaphor, we have empirical data not 
explicable by the dead/alive distinction, so we posit a sleeping/waking dynamical 
                                               
9 I here channel Steen’s observation (2011) that the field of metaphor studies does not necessarily revolve 
around one and only one research program, that of CMT. The same argument could be made against the 
dynamical view. My aim is thus to buttress the dynamical view against this objection. 
10 Note that my argument says nothing about the clear predictions made from CMT nor that these cannot 
be coherent with the dynamical approach. My argument is that qua separate research program 
(succeeding and covering predecessors) the dynamical view of metaphor is at the moment not able to 
advance any new research hypotheses and that this inadequacy is because it is fact dependent. I believe 
the current dynamical view is nothing more than CMT plus all alterations necessary to fit the latest 
empirical results (cf. Hampe, 2017b: 7). Such alterations are often formulated in the language of DST or 
mention spatiotemporal complexities and multidimensionality. While the dynamical view has so far 
helped to solve or redress concerns with extant problems in metaphor studies, I think as an overarching 
research program it has not been advanced far enough yet. 
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construct of metaphoricity as selective activation realized by general cognitive process. 
What is needed is a broad and comprehensive background theory to base our dynamic 
models of metaphor in action on. Next to enabling novel predictions, it makes sure that 
in the heat of our empirical data collection and studies, we do not fall back into 
reductionism to lower or more basic explanatory levels or fall prey to creeping 
Cartesianism.11 The last would makes us reinvent and ontologize old dichotomies like 
mind/body, fact/value, or conceptual/linguistic and embodied/discursive. In my opinion, 
if Müller’s distinction between cognitive amodal metaphoricity process and multimodal 
output or products is not carefully read, it is already dangerously close to relapsing into a 
cognition/action dichotomy. 
 
4. THE ECOLOGICAL-ENACTIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Now, following arguments that all metaphor use is not merely embedded in a 
physical but also a social and cultural sense, I outline how one particular background 
theory affords a comprehensive dynamical account of metaphor use. 
Coming from the modern paradigm of 4E cognitive science (where the 4 E’s stand 
for embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended cognition approaches) the ecological-
enactive framework is a fitting theory as guide to discovery.12 In addition to having been 
the source of several dynamical models (Chemero, 2009: 101) it provides a rich 
background on the nature of action, perception, and cognition, establishing a 
comprehensive view of how an organism interacts with and engages its environment. This 
will allow for hypothesis generation regarding what metaphor is and does (cf. Hampe, 
2017a: 4). To start in explaining how the ecological-enactive framework can benefit 
metaphor studies, I will need to say a few things about the theory itself. The compound 
term indicates the theory combines insights from both ecological psychology and 
enactivism. 
The locus classicus for enactivism is found in the work of Maturana and Varela 
(Maturana and Varela, 1980; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). Enactivism sees the 
organism as a self-organizing, autonomous, autopoietic system which “generates and 
maintains itself constantly through structural and functional change” (Di Paolo and 
Thompson, 2014: 68). Cognition is shaped by the action-orientation of a living system 
within its environment, from bacteria to humans. Further shaping involves homeostatic 
life regulation processes (Damasio, 2010; Tucker, 2007) and the sociohistorical enfolding 
of sensorimotor couplings, or developmental dynamics, between an organism and its 
environment (Noë, 2004; Schulkin, 2011: 6-7; Gallagher, 2017: 5ff). 
The classic ecological psychology work by Gibson formulates an ecological 
theory of perception directly opposed to the then dominant computational theory of mind 
(1966, 1979). His ecological approach has three core principles (Chemero, 2009: 98). 
First, perception is direct. Perception is not the result of an inferential process, i.e. adding 
internal information to external sensations represented somewhere in a cranium. 
Perceiving is part of a system that contains the organism and the environment, including 
                                               
11 Creeping Cartesianism is the phenomenon described by Solymosi and Shook (2013). We can see it at 
work in a lot of cognitive science where there is talk of information being represented by particular 
things, like brain states or patterns. Such views easily degrade back into sensationalistic empiricism 
where the mind represents or mirrors the world. 
12 4E cognition is a relatively young and thriving field of interdisciplinary research. It assumes that 
cognition is shaped and structured by dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and both the physical 
and social environments. Importantly for my efforts here, cognition is enacted in that it implicates the 
active engagement of an organism in and with its environment (cf. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; 
Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014). 
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the perceived object or event. Second, perception is for action. An organism perceives its 
environment in order to do things, and it does things in order to perceive (cf. Dewey, 
1896; Noë, 2004; Johnson, 2017). Third, perception is of affordances. This principle 
follows from the previous two. For perception to be direct, and to guide action, the 
environment must contain adequate information for an organism’s perceptual systems. 
Such ecological information is the set of structures and regularities in the environment 
that allow an organism to engage with affordances. Gibson’s notion of affordances, as we 
will see later, is an often discussed and misconstrued concept (Chemero 2009; Heras-
Escribano 2019). For now, it suffices to say that affordances are both possibilities for 
action provided by the environment and depend in some sense on an organism’s abilities 
and skills.13 This coffee cup affords grasping, both because of its surface and layout, and 
because I possess the right skills. 
The combined and complementary insights from ecological psychology and 
enactivism importantly enable an explanation of both ‘lower’ cognition, such as basic 
pattern recognition or locomotion, and ‘higher’ cognition, such as language use or 
instances where aspects of the environment are not sensorially present. Such an 
encompassing background theory as part of the augmented dynamical view of metaphor 
allows for engulfing theoretical and empirical content of both the cognition and discourse 
approaches in metaphor studies and is of import when a dynamical view attempts to unify 
the field of metaphor studies. 
In the next section I highlight one important theoretical resource from the 
ecological-enactive framework, the environment, and show how this can help further 
dissolve debates in metaphor studies. Finally, I will show how my dynamical approach, 
where metaphor is seen as an ecological affordance of the socio-cultural environment, 
can be used to predict novel empirical hypotheses one could experimentally test.  
 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT FOR METAPHOR 
 
I have argued that the ecological-enactive framework is an ideal background 
theory for a dynamical understanding of a diversity of behaviour, including metaphorical 
action. I now want to indicate how recent insights regarding the notion of environment—
and how these impact the respective understanding of ecological information and 
affordances within our ecological-enactive background theory—can help to further the 
unification attempts in metaphor studies. 
Baggs and Chemero (2019) note that many debates in ecological psychology in 
the last decades have been about understanding the central concepts of information and 
affordances. In their view these debates have their root cause in Gibson’s ambiguous 
definition of environment.14 Gibson’s project starts of by distinguishing between two 
ways in which the world surrounds an organism (1979). There is the physical world 
“structured in various ways, prior to and irrespective of the existence of any animal living 
in it,“ and the environment “at the terrestrial scale” in which “animals have evolved to 
perceive and act, relative to objects and surfaces that are meaningful because they offer 
possibilities for action” (Baggs and Chemero, 2019: 2) Problems arose because Gibson 
tried to have environment stand both for the surroundings of an individual living organism 
                                               
13 For an extended account see Chemero’s influential treatment (2009, 135-154). 
14 They trace it back to Gibson’s own statement regarding his possible problematic double use of 
environment: “The environment consists of the surroundings of animals. Let us observe that in one sense 
the surroundings of a single animal are the same as the surroundings of all animals but that in another 
sense the surroundings of a single animal are different from those of any other animal. These two senses 
of the term can be troublesome and may cause confusion” (Gibson, 1979: 3). 
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and the surroundings of an idealized member of a species. What is missing is the 
differentiation between the evolutionary history of a species and the developmental 
history of a particular organism. The Gibsonian environment, argue Baggs and Chemero, 
should be carved up in the environment as it exists for a typical member of a species—
the habitat —and the environment as it exists for a particular member of this species—
the organism-specific umwelt.15 With this reconstructed concept of environment, Baggs 
and Chemero go on showing how some standing tensions within ecological psychology 
can be resolved. Of these I will treat affordances and information and indicate the impact 




Affordances are conceptualized as either dispositional or relational properties. 
They are dispositional properties belonging to objects and surfaces and as affordance 
actualized when an organism with a complimentary dispositional property comes into 
contact with it. They are relational properties when they are not simply ‘out there’ but can 
potentially arise in the organism-environment interaction. The question whether 
affordances are dispositional or relational properties is dissolved by explicating their 
different purpose. In the habitat affordances are dispositional properties or resources, 
existing independently of any given organism, and can exert selection pressure. In the 
umwelt affordances are relational properties, depend for their existence on the continued 
survival of a particular organism, and are undergoing constant change as the organism’s 
abilities and skills grow or degenerate. I have learned to walk stairs as a child, perfected 
it as a teenager, and slowly but steadily get worse at it through later life. The stairs have 
existed before me, will exist after me, but in my umwelt the stairs afford different and 
changing ways of ascend-ability throughout life depending on length and strength of my 
limbs and certain coordination of abilities. The umwelt allows us to talk about differences 
between individual members of a species. It also explains why particular organisms have 
a selective engagement with affordances: some affordances can invite or solicit particular 
behaviours (cf. Withagen et al., 2017), which I will come back to in later. The habitat 
provides a ‘landscape of affordances,’ all possibilities together forming a species’ 
ecological niche (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). The umwelt consists of a ‘field of 
affordances,’ this or that momentarily available relevant and limited set of possibilities 
(van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017). I recur to the example of climbing the stairs. At any given 
moment in time the climb-ability of the stairs stands out as most relevant. But the stairs 
do also afford sitting-on, putting-things-on, and even sleeping-on. Changes in abilities 
through ontogenetic development and later degeneration of physical and mental function 
make us engage with different sets of affordances the objects in our environment offer us. 
Such development includes learning a language, acculturation of norms by partaking in 
diverse social practices, and obviously foundational conceptual understanding of the 
world—including the embodied understanding as reflected in our highly particular cache 
of primary and more complex metaphors. 
 
5.2. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION 
 
                                               
15 Baggs and Chemero (2018: 6) note that this distinction does not imply that the umwelt is a “private, 
mental copy of the habitat,” but the habitat “considered from the point of view of a particular living 
animal.” Neither is the habitat separate from the physical world, but it is a “subset” of it “considered 
relative to a typical member of a species.” The actions of an organism normally have consequences in the 
umwelt, habitat, and the physical world. 
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Ecological information is traditionally understood as structure in energy arrays 
and is both about what structure in the world provided the array’s pattern, and for an 
organism serving to guide its action. The question whether information is information-
about or information-for is dissolved as well. In the habitat we talk of information-about. 
Information-about something is specified in certain patterns in the energy array and 
available for certain species. An example of this can be found in a pie that is cooling off 
in the kitchen, whereby certain chemicals are released into the air. In the umwelt we talk 
of information-for. Information-for a specific organism with the appropriate skills or 
abilities is available for detection and such information is actively sought by the living 
organism. A fly using the chemical trail in the air to actively seek out food is an example. 
The potential guide for activity is information-about, i.e. containing a (specifying) 
structure in energy arrays, available through direct perception as information-for pickup 
by the organism’s perceptual system. Early followers of Gibson held on to a symmetry 
principle, a strict one-to-one relationship between ecological information and the 
affordance it specified (Baggs and Chemero, 2019: 8). If we allow that this relationship 
need not be exception-free but just sufficiently reliable to guide behaviour in usual 
circumstances we create room for non-specifying (or conventional) information being 
present in the habitat. Such information depends in part on our activities as a community 
of convention-makers and -observers often within a variety of social practices (Heft, 
2017, 2018; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017). Allowing for 
non-conventional information to account for things we can directly perceive entails that 
an ecological approach can be further developed to deal with phenomena of culture and 
language. These aspects of our socio-material environment then enter as sources of richly 
structured information into both senses of the notion of environment providing possibility 
for (skilled) action (Heft, 2017; McGann, 2014). 
I noted before that any successor theory unifying previous approaches in a 
scientific field should at least account for empirical findings, constructs and hypotheses 
of these previous approaches. Therefore, I will now see how ecological-enactivism as 
background theory for a dynamical view of metaphor holds up when confronted with 
some of the material noted by Hampe. 
 
6. RECONSTRUCTION IN METAPHOR 
 
I will explicate and further elaborate on both conceptual metaphors as individual 
possession and on conventionalized metaphors within a language. 
First off, we can put the reconstructed notions treated above towards good use in 
understanding the critique on conceptual metaphors understood as static representations 
in individual minds (Hampe, 2017b: 6). Discourse analysts rightly state such static 
notions could not explain the emergence of metaphorical expressions in the social 
interaction of participants in specific contexts, nor the intricate patterns of co-occurrence 
over stretches of time or related communicative events—including the shifts in 
metaphorical meaning accompanying them (ibidem: 7). In an unfolding discourse 
situation, as speakers enact it, each linguistic or metaphorical action changes the 
dynamics and the available ecological information available for pickup by the 
participants. This provides affordances available for perception within participant’s 
umwelt-based fields of affordances, further leading to possibly changing linguistic 
abilities and repertoire being put forward (cf. Jensen, 2017, 2018). The metaphors each 
participant has available in this repertoire is a matter of which metaphors they have picked 
up in their respective and unique developmental histories in the habitat-situated social 
practices they were or are a part of. The constant change of dynamics within a 
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communicative situation, brings a constant change of metaphoricity and selective 
engagement for each participant based on how each metaphor draws the participant in (cf. 
Gibbs and Cameron, 2008; Jensen, 2017, 2018). 
Second, not all possible primary metaphors formed through experiential 
correlations available in the species-specific habitat are so reflected in conventionalized 
language of a particular linguistic community. Here (material) culture, social practices, 
and place may function as a ‘filter’, a higher-order emergent structure providing down-
ward force, making certain aspects of embodied experience more salient (cf. Köveceses 
2015; Heft, 2017, 2018). The classic example here is how some linguistic communities 
employ KNOWING IS HEARING instead of the more common KNOWING IS SEEING primary 
metaphor. We can understand this as follows. Through the social practices within the 
material setting of their environment, the available structured information in the medium 
combined with the skills of the humans within the community will more often have led 
to affordances related to hearing being actualized. Eventually the language system as part 
of their ecological niche will have started to reflect this enacting of cases of knowing in 
an environment often inviting hearing behaviour.16 
Taken together, these two examples show that ecological-enactivism can place the 
findings related to culture, language systems, discourse situations, and cognitive events 
within the conceptual framework consisting of environment (as habitat and umwelt), 
ecological information, and affordances (cf. Hampe, 2017b: 10-12). Additionally, the 
framework allows for more stringent theoretical elaboration than a dynamical view 
without a background theory. It enables explanations of individual, local dyad, 
sociocultural group, and population level differences in a more consistent matter and 
specific vocabulary over and above what dynamic systems theory can do with its general 
(abstract) principles (cf. Chemero, 2009). From an ecological perspective on cognition 
and situated behaviour it places theoretical constraints upon a dynamical view of 
metaphor which allows for its guidance function. 
In order for the dynamical view of metaphor to become a progressive research 
program and provide a guide to discovery I argued three methodological criteria must be 
met. First, it should be able to engulf existing (dynamical) explanations of metaphor by 
positing a background theory. I have done so in this section. Second, this augmented 
dynamical view allows for basing dynamical models of metaphor in action on. This was 
shown in the treatment of ecological-enactivism. Third, it must provide a guide to 
discovery by suggesting new hypotheses based on positing entities or properties. We 




It would seem I have almost reached my goal of putting forward a background 
theory which can envelop the unification attempts in metaphor studies which have led to 
a dynamical view of metaphor. However, one of the hallmarks of such a theory according 
to Chemero (2009) is that it must also function as guide to discovery by postulating an 
underlying, unobservable structure (like the atomists did in physics), or at least clarify 
what a metaphor is. 
I treated the work of Müller, Gibbs, Cameron, and Jensen which increasingly 
characterizes metaphor as a processual phenomenon. While the use of dynamic systems 
theory provided a notion of metaphor as emergent stabilities over individual, dyad, group, 
                                               
16 Here I want to point the reader to the theory of behaviour settings developed by the ‘other’ ecological 
psychologist, Roger Barker and colleagues (see Heft, 2017, 2018). I do not have the room here to treat 
this further but see fruitful cross-disciplinary applications. 
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and even population or linguistic community levels, a move I termed dynamical turn, 
thereby importantly accommodating extant findings to date within metaphor studies, I 
have argued this leaves the current dynamical view of metaphor as an overarching 
research program without a clearly fruitful way forward. In this final section my aim is to 
argue that to trace the functional idea of what a metaphor does, we need to (re)locate it 
back into social situations, and by locating it there we can also give an ecologically valid 
account of what metaphor is.17 In doing so I suggest elaborating on the notion of 
affordance with metaphordance as the unit of analysis for the dynamical view of 
metaphor. 
Linguistic structure, Hampe’s language system as inventory of symbolic units (cf. 
Hampe, 2017b: 12), has cultural and sociomaterial differences and is situated in the 
species-specific habitat. This emergent and slowly evolving structure functions within the 
umwelt of discourse participants as an informational constraint on the perception of 
affordances.18 Or, as Gibson said, “the learning of language […] is not simply the 
associative naming or labelling of impressions from the world. It is also, and more 
importantly, an expression of the distinctions, abstractions, and recognitions that [we 
come] to achieve in perceiving” (1966: 281). It has come to produce this down-ward force 
through the unique ontogenetic development and sensorimotor couplings of a particular 
individual of the species. Any linguistic utterance makes an observer aware. There is 
selection of information for purposes of indication, of directing attention through 
linguistically coded information (cf. Reed and Jones, 1982: 242). Whereas visual or 
pictorial information shows something, we are to a large degree left to draw our own 
conclusions. With language we can become aware of the conclusions other people draw. 
As speakers we are constantly piloting other agents’ awareness of reasons to behave, 
making others pick up information specific to the (shared) environment. Some of the 
affordances that are then perceived might have to do with more basic ecological features, 
but others are more cultural and have to do with specific spatiotemporally evolved 
meaning and value. As humans we are preoccupied with “socializing the selection and 
detection of information itself,” that become codified in cultural systems, but importantly 
lead to “discrete (and often warring) communities of meaning” (Reed, 1988: 310). 
I contend that within the ecological-enactive framework, this is what we can 
hypothesize a metaphor does: it both constrains what out of the possible affordances is 
perceived or attended to in the participant’s umwelt, and it also solicits certain behaviour 
(which is not necessarily linguistic) by the ways it influences awareness of directly 
perceivable meaning and value in the habitat (cf. Reed and Jones, 1982: 410; Jensen and 
Greve, 2019).19 As this prediction is still too vague and can apply to literal utterances a 
clarification is needed. 
To elucidate the working of metaphordances, it helps to first treat the inviting or 
soliciting character of affordances on behaviour (Withagen, et al., 2017). At any moment 
of time during its existence an organism has a so-called selective openness towards 
affordances due to the developmental history of organism-environment couplings. This 
is most visible when we talk of an organism’s ecological niche, or its whole set of 
available affordances in the habitat. An example will illustrate this further. Chairs afford 
                                               
17 I provide a full philosophical conceptualization of metaphordances, as I call this notion, in a separate 
paper (Machielsen, 2019). 
18 The functioning of the linguistic system within discourse was noted by Müller (2008: 221); the 
constraining down-ward force was noted by Jensen (2018: 19; Jensen and Greve, 2019). 
19 I have made the same claim from a pragmatist naturalist point of view in my Metaphor in Moral 
Imagination (2017). There I elaborate on a fourfold function of influence: priming, framing, obscuring, 
and steering. 
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many different actions to which we are selectively open because of our species-specific 
embodiment and socio-cultural practices. This is what we do with chairs, this is what we 
do not or no longer do with chairs. One could say this constitutes the emergent and slowly 
changing structure of socio-cultural norms around chairs available in the habitat. When a 
member of the species grows up, enculturation according to such available extant 
structures takes place, shaping the individual’s pragmatic umwelt, their field of 
affordances related to chairs. Selective openness takes place within the organism’s 
umwelt as well. Here we see that selective openness towards affordances does not solely 
depend on our bodily features and enculturation, but also to our changing needs and 
concerns over time. Out of all possible affordances a glass provides, right now it is 
perceived as a glass of water to drink from. Our changing skills are another factor shaping 
selective openness, as when an infant’s bodily features would allow them to ride a bicycle, 
but the needed skills are not present yet. Last, our moving around towards different places 
within the environment distinctively shapes selective openness to affordances—a fridge 
within the house of a distant relative does not present us with the same open-and-take-
drink-out affordance (cf. Withagen, et al., 2017). 
I contend that selective openness and the resultant invitational character projected 
by affordances does not stop at prelinguistic behaviour. Because we have conceptualized 
of an affordance as a relation, with the relata being an aspect of the socio-material 
environment and an organism’s skill or ability, we can characterize a solicitation as an 
effect of the interactional asymmetry within the organism-environment coupling (cf. 
Heras-Escribano, 2019: 133). In this context, phenomenologists often talk about an 
organism having the “feeling [of] immediately [being] drawn to do something [where] 
the subject experiences no act of the will” (Dreyfus and Kelly, 2007, 52). Here the 
environment does not provide a set of possibilities for action, but the environment is 
“calling for a certain way of acting” (ibid.) with the organism bodily responding to such 
callings. As stated before, behavior is always an emergent out of the interactions between 
brain, body, and environment. In most cases, the behavior taking place follows the path 
of least resistance—which is not necessarily always the same, we are talking about 
dynamics—with the organism following up on the invitations presented by the 
affordances.20 
Metaphordances disclose a shifting landscape of action possibilities in the habitat 
presented to us as particular fields of action potentialities in our pragmatic umwelt.21 
Metaphordances emerge within, between, and through discourse in interpersonal 
ecologies that contain our interlocutors, physical artifacts, socio-material tools, and a 
diversity of operative constraints. The disclosing is often paired with the invitation 
characteristically projected by metaphordances. These are, compared to more 
conventional linguistic codified information, to a greater degree both open for 
interpretation and have a higher indeterminacy in that they allow for a wider range of 
potential meaning and value to be considered available in the environment than those 
utterances that are referential. In a way, a metaphordance allows speakers to appeal to 
participant’s umwelts with the uniquely developed fields of affordances, whereas 
conventional language would more often than not refer to settled meaning and values that 
are shared with a wider community. Metaphordances work to open up, unsettle, and 
influence meaning and value perception by the projections of potential meaning and value 
                                               
20 I note here that my approach takes into consideration the biological free energy principle. This principle 
is used to explain how (biological) systems stay in homeostatic equilibrium through restriction of possible 
states (cf. Damasio, 2010; see Friston, et al., 2006). 
21 Note that for me the effect of a metaphordance is not just within discourse situations. Jensen (2017, 
2018) is not clear on his scope of effect but seems to suggest it is discourse limited. 
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made apparent by specific metaphorical utterances. Speakers appeal to participants to co-
create meaning and value by making participants aware of potentialities in the habitat, by 
the projections of meaning and value inherent in metaphordances that resonate in 
participant’s unique umwelts. 
The unique interaction effects a metaphor as affordance shows within the dynamic 





To summarize, I started out with noting that within metaphor studies there is 
currently an ongoing convergence upon a dynamical view of metaphor. The move toward 
a dynamical view was prompted by roadblocks accumulating through all too dogmatic 
following of either the cognition or communication paradigm (Hampe, 2017a). 
Interdisciplinary study increases in import; the more so since metaphor theory is argued 
to be moving towards a dynamic, multi-scale, socio-cognitive model of metaphor 
incorporating findings of diverse studies and approaches focusing on different levels of 
analysis (Hampe, 2017b: 34). At the moment, however, this dynamical view of metaphor 
is just a set of models from dynamic systems theory, which is perfectly fine if all you 
wanted to do is reinterpret the existing empirical data from both the cognition and 
communication approaches to metaphor. Taking for granted a move beyond fact-
dependent research is wanted, I have argued that having the ecological-enactive 
framework as background theory is an excellent guide to discovery, as it provides both a 
source for dynamical models to investigate metaphorical phenomena, and it postulates 
what metaphor is and does in terminology of affordances which is widely used in 
interdisciplinary studies. The latter would open up metaphor studies even more to new 
cooperative efforts and vistas. I examined how the species-specific habitat and organism 
particular umwelt illuminated current debates in metaphor studies. The ecological-
enactive framework makes one fully appreciate “that the way the world looks to us is to 
some extent a result of the way we currently are as individuals” (Baggs and Chemero, 
2018: 3). I also put forward my admittedly still embryonic notion of metaphordance—or 
metaphor as affordance, as generative for new hypotheses. Leading from this I suggest 
the following perspectives for further research:  
 
1. Research by enactivist cognitive scientists and ecological psychologists that 
take into account the rich history of findings within metaphor studies. Little to no 
work is done in this area so far. 
2. Interdisciplinary studies where metaphor researchers, cognitive scientists and 
philosophers look into which ontogenetic and phylogenetic factors lead to 
metaphordances working as invitations in a diversity of (discourse) contexts. 
3. One empirical hypothesis that follows from the difference between affordances 
and invitations would be that metaphor usage not salient or relevant to a specific 
(discourse) event or situation would not have the same information uptake (and 
thus direct perception of metaphordances) as coherent metaphor usage would. 
 
To conclude, I contend my augmented dynamical view of metaphor shows itself 
capable to deal with the demands stated by Hampe that “any empirically valid theory of 
metaphor needs to take into account … [that next to] social interaction [and] language 
systems, … the use of metaphor in discourse feeds on rich, situated experiences that may 
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also determine the salience of a given source domain in a particular communicative 
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